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1 The Market for Inalienable Goods 
    This article analyzes the market mechanism for small and medium-sized 
companies in Japan.  The Japanese small family businesses referred to as “goods” for 
sale have unique aspects.  In short, the companies are not easily detachable from their 
owner managers.  Owner managers have a strong emotional commitment to their 
business and their workers.    It is difficult  for owner managers to sell their companies.   
However, when owner managers face succession problems, they manage to sell their 
companies in order to continue their businesses and assure employment of their workers.   
The owner managers tend to feel a strong ambivalence in this situation: he wants not to 
sell, but he has no choice.  Research question in this paper is how people (offers, 
buyers, and intermediaries) transact small companies as undetachable and inalienable 
goods.   
    In general, people choose gift rather than market exchange for irreplaceable and 
inalienable things (Carrier, 1995; Gregory, 1982; Mauss, 1990; Weiner, 1992).  In the 
Trobriand Islands, tribes present precious necklace, bracelet, or arms to other tribes and 
refrain from pursuing their interest through bargaining (Malinowski, 1922).  In 
modernized countries, most of economic transaction of inalienable things- human, 
human organ, blood, sexuality and so on- are prohibited or socially criticized (Radin, 
1996; Titmuss, 1997; Zelizer, 2002).  These things are inalienable from their owner.  
In market societies, however, people can manage to buy and sell even inalienable goods 
if they try to do so.    I wonder what type of exchange form emerges in such situations.     
    This article argues that the market for small and medium-sized companies as 
“inalienable goods”.  The exchange form for these companies emerges as not purely 
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  2economic exchanges.  The exchange form has both aspects of gift and commodity 
exchanges.  Owner mangers tend not to pursue economic benefit.  When selecting 
potential acquirers, the most important criteria for owners is the integrity of M&A top 
management.  This takes precedence over the selling price.   This is one aspect of 
gift exchanges.  On the other hand, owner managers prefer the anonymity in the 
market.  Owner managers prefer not to sell their businesses to companies which have 
some direct relations with them because owner mangers tend to feel ill at ease.    That’s 
why owner mangers prefer the market anonymity to close social relation.  This is an 
aspect of market exchanges. Generally, acquirers define the transaction as commodity 
exchanges and attempt to carry out the transaction rationally compared to owner 
managers.    Conflicts may occur between acquirers and owner managers in terms of the 
meaning or definition of the transaction (gift or market exchange) rather than pricing or 
other conditions of contract.  M&A intermediaries assume the role of solving this 
conflict and balancing between gift and commodity exchanges.     
        The exchange form of small and medium-sized companies emerges as hybrid type 
of exchange between gift and economic exchange.  Both aspects contribute to the 
functioning of the market.    We may be able to find out such hybrid exchange forms in 
other situations.  In market economies, we have opportunities of buying and selling 
inalienable goods.  Market exchange of the inalienable may not be a pure economic 
transaction but have both aspects of gift and commodity exchanges.  As the market 
becomes to cover not only alienable goods but inalienable goods, hybrid type 
transactions emerge further more frequently.  We may be able to see complex, 
intermediate types of exchange in the “commodity frontier” (Hochschild, 2001).   
 
2 Existing Literatures on Hybrid Exchange Forms   
Some researchers indicate the hybrid exchange forms between gift and commodity 
exchanges.    Malinowski (1922) categorizes various types of exchange on the spectrum 
between “pure gift” and “pure bartering”.    “Pure bartering” means purely an economic 
exchange. People pursue their economic interest in “pure bartering”.  “Pure gift” 
means a unilateral gift which is gift without counter-gift.   Malinowski (1922) sets 
  3“reciprocity”, which means gift with counter-gift, between “pure gift” and “pure 
bartering”.   
    Blau (1964) and Sahlins (1972) also categorize various types of exchanges in the 
spectrum.  Blau (1964) sets “pure expression of love” and “pure calculation of 
advantage” as each side poles of the spectrum.  Sahlins (1972) sets “generalized 
reciprocity” and “negative reciprocity” as each of the poles.    “Pure expression of love” 
and “generalized reciprocity” mean gift without counter-gift, for example mother’s love 
for babies or blood donation.  “Pure calculation of advantage” and “negative 
reciprocity” include criminal opportunistic behavior, such as theft or deceit.  Blau 
(1964) and Sahlins (1972), as Figure 1 shows, categorize market exchange and gift 
giving with reciprocity between these poles.     
 


















Figure 1 indicates various types of exchange and also the existence of hybrid 
exchange types between gift and market exchanges.  Transactions  via  market  may  have 
aspects of gift as well as gift exchanges may have aspects of market exchanges. These 
are hybrid type exchanges.     
Herrmann (1997) argues the hybrid type exchange in her research on the U.S. 
garage sale.    In the social context of the garage sale, two factors generate hybrid types 
of exchanges, first is the relation of owners to properties for sale, and second is the 
relation of owners to neighborhood.  The owners sell their unneeded articles but they 
  4have some emotional attachment to the articles.  Herrmann refers these articles as 
“inalienable commodities”.  The relation of owners to their properties and 
neighborhood make the transaction not purely an economic exchange.    Owners abstain 
from pursuing their economic interest and they sometimes sell their articles for very 
little or as good as free for their close neighbors.  This is an element of gifts at the 
garage sale. 
    Although we can observe the element of gift giving in the case of the garage sale, 
we should also focus on the element of market exchanges.  Herrmann (1997) argues 
that the participants (sellers and buyers) prefer the seemingly “market style” of the 
garage sale because people in a market society are accustomed to the “market style” of 
transaction.  Sellers set a price for each articles even if they sale some items at 
giveaway prices or almost free.  People may feel it is much easier to take part in the 
market type transaction than in pure gift exchanges, although they may enjoy the 
atmosphere of gift giving in the garage sale.  Herrmann insists that both elements of 
gift and market exchanges facilitate flow of articles at the garage sale.       
    I have researched and discovered hybrid types of exchange in the market for 
Japanese small and medium-sized companies.  We can see each element of gift and 
commodity exchange in each phase of M&A processes.  I argue how each element 
emerges in each phase of the transaction, and what the function each element has.   
 
3 Elements of Gift and Commodity Exchanges 
I clarify each of the elements of gift and commodity exchanges in this section in 
order to argue in the next section the character of the market for small and 
medium-sized companies.  In this paper, I focus on four elements of gift and 
commodity exchanges: 1) the relationship of owner to their properties, 2) between 
transactors, 3) price setting, 4) transferability of ownership.  Table1 shows these four 




















Table1　Gift and Commodity Exchange
 
 
(1) The Relationship between Person and Things 
The relationship of owners to their properties affects the type of exchange.  
People tend to adopt gift giving when people exchange undetachable, inalienable things, 
and conversely, people tend to transact via market when things are actually detachable 
and alienable (Carrier, 1995; Gregory, 1982; Mauss, 1990; Weiner, 1992).     
If people transact inalienable things via market, they may feel ambivalence or  
may be criticized socially (Hochschild, 2004; Zelizer, 1979, 2002).    Inalienable things, 
for example, love, blood, or children, are regarded as “sacred” things.  The value of 
sacred things deteriorates when the sacred things are evaluated with “secular” monetary 
criteria (Belk, 1988; Espeland and Stevens, 1998; Zelizer, 1979, 2002).  We tend to 
adopt gift giving as an exchange form of inalienable things in order to avoid 
deteriorating the sacred value and the integrity of human beings.     
 
(2) The Relationship between Transactors 
The relationship between participants of exchanges situations also influences forms 
of exchanges (Carrier, 1991; Sahlins, 1972).  When people transact something with 
family or friends, they tend to use gift exchange even if they exchange alienable things.   
As Herrmann (1997) argues, the strong ties of participants make humans refrain from 
pursuing their economic benefit through the transaction.  People, on the other hand, 
  6can pursue their interest when they  transact  anonymously.   
  We choose exchange forms related to the other transactor and also select the 
transactor suitable for the type of exchange form which we want to adopt.  For 
example, when you want to get some money by selling your used books, you may sell 
them to secondhand bookstores or on websites at possibly higher prices.  If you want 
to strengthen the relationship to your friends or colleagues, you may gift used books or 
sell them at a lower price.  The gift-giving creates a form of psychological debt in the 
recipient.    The psychological debt may make the receiver counter-gift you sometime at 
a future day and the relationship between both may be strengthened (Mauss, 1990).   
 
(3) Price Setting and Equivalence 
   In market transactions, people set price economic rationally and equivalent 
exchanges are realized.  Transactors seek their interest each other but the resulting 
price may be based on agreement and reasonable in an economic sense. 
  Gift giving with and without counter-gift is un-equivalent exchange (Sahlins, 1972).  
Values of gifts and counter-gifts tend to be not same.  The sender can not receive 
anything from the receiver in a situation of pure gift, but the sender may be satisfied to 
be altruistic.  When the sender can receive counter-gifts from the receiver, the sender 
does not or should not care about whether the value of counter-gifts is equivalent or not.   
Participants of gift exchange, for example, at Christmas time, never negotiate over 
equivalence of their gifts.     
 
(4) Transferability of Ownership 
  Transferability of ownership is one condition of market transaction.  Once owners 
sell their properties via market, they lose ownership and new owners have the right to 
use and dispose of the properties.  Equivalent exchange of market transaction assures 
transferability of ownership (Carrier, 1995).     
Conversely, transferability of ownership becomes uncertain in un-equivalent 
exchange, especially when senders gift their properties without counter-gift.  Although 
the gift transfers to the receiver, the giver keeps some influence over the receiver in 
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the sender force to.    If you want to keep a right to say something after exchange, you’d 
better gift your properties not sell them.   
Weiner (1992) refers, in the research of the Trobriand Islands, such a strategy as 
“keeping-while-giving”.  When tribes must exchange their precious properties with 
each other and they seek to keep a right to retrieve their properties, they adopt gift 
exchange and the strategy “keeping-while-giving”.     
 
        I discussed four elements of gift and commodity exchange.    The categorization is 
simplified for analytical convenience.  Exchanges in real situations are so much more 
complex that we can not categorize them dichotomically, gift or commodity exchange.    
The M&A process of small and medium-sized companies I will discuss below is also 
mosaic types of transaction.     
 
4 Method 
    I  researched  the  market  by  interviewing owner managers of small and 
medium-sized companies from 2003 to 2006.  I held interviews with nine owner 
managers who had sold their companies, three employees of each acquirees, twenty 
intermediaries, two top managements of acquirers and four new presidents of the 
acquirees.   
I met each of the management of the acquirers or acquirees by the way of 
introduction through intermediaries.    Information on M&A of small and medium-sized 
companies tends not to be open on newspaper or other media, so it is difficult to meet 
the management without intermediaries’ cooperation.     
    The questions I asked each interviewee were about their actions, intentions, and 
personal feelings in each phase of the M&A processes.    For example, the questions for 
owner managers were, “How did you make up your mind to sale your business?” “What 
types of acquirer do you prefer?” “Did your thought of and feelings toward your 
companies change after the sale?”     
      The hypothesis on the market for small and medium-sized companies was generated 
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commodity exchanges in the M&A processes of small family businesses.  I discuss 
below how the elements of gift and commodity exchange emerge and function at each 
phases of the M&A processes.     
 
5 The Market Mechanism for Small and Medium-sized Companies 
    The M&A processes of small and medium-sized companies can be described 
simply in the following way: 1) owner managers consult intermediaries about their 
succession problems; 2) intermediaries search potential acquirers suitable to owner 
managers’ preference; 3) acquirers and acquirees negotiate over the terms of contract 
(prices, treatment of employees and so on) indirectly through intermediaries; 4) 
transactors enter into an agreement and the ownership of companies transfers to the 
acquirers.   
We can see the hybrid types of exchange especially at the second (searching), third 
(negotiating), and forth (transfer of ownership) phases.  Each phase relates to the 
elements of gift and commodity exchanges discussed above: the relationship between 
transactors, price setting and transferability of ownership.  The relationship of owner 
managers (persons) and businesses (things) influences each phase of M&A transactions.   
Let me discuss firstly the relationship of owners and businesses.       
 
(1) The relationships between owners and companies: Sale of Inalienable Goods 
    Owner  managers  have  a  strong  personal  relationship with their businesses and their 
workers because owner managers have managed their businesses for a long time and the 
relationship of owner managers to the workers tends to be strengthened in a small 
organization.   
    Many informants told me this point.  An intermediary of Hiroshima Bank said 
“small companies are the body and soul of owner managers” and an owner manager 
said “My workers are comrades, I have lived with them longer than with my own 
family”.  We can categorize Japanese small and medium-sized companies as 
quasi-inalienable  goods.   
  9    In general, inalienable goods tend to be exchanged through gift exchange not 
market transaction.  Owner managers also prefer to gift their companies to their 
children.  Nowadays, however, children prefer choosing their jobs of their own will 
instead of succeeding their parents businesses.    Thus, succession problems occur much 
more  frequently.   
When owner managers face the succession problem but they try to continue their 
businesses, they make up their mind to sell their businesses to other companies.  If 
owner managers were very generous and do not have any monetary interests, they might 
choose to gift their companies to a third party, but in fact, owner managers are not so 
generous and they need some funds for their retirement.    Even if owner managers were 
so generous enough to gift their companies, potential acquirers would refuse the offer 
and prefer market transaction to gift giving because potential acquirers are afraid that 
the transfer of ownership is ambiguous in gift giving and owner managers retain their 
influences over their companies.       
    This is why owner managers choose market transaction as an exchange form for 
alienating their businesses to other companies.  When owner managers sell their 
businesses, they tend to feel ambivalence or have a guilty conscience.  Owner 
managers are sensitive to criticism from their workers or their acquaintances in other 
companies.    One owner manager had this to say regarding this point:   
 
    People have a negative image of owner managers when they sell their business in 
order to profit or make money.  This image is completely different from the fact.  
Unfortunately, this negative image for M&A of small companies is still dominant 
in Japan.     
 
This owner manager was sensitive about this  negative  image.  Although he decided to 
sell his company in order to continue his business and assure the employment of his 
workers, his acquaintances thought that he sold his business for money, so he was 
indignant and irritated.     
        Since owner managers feel ambivalence or have a guilty conscience when they sell 
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as a pure market transaction.  Owner managers think their transactors as successors 
rather than buyers and refrain from pursuing their financial benefit.  They attach 
importance to the integrity and reliability of M&A top managements as the main criteria 
or most important criteria when selecting acquirers rather than the selling price.  We 
can categorize these aspects as conditions or elements of gift exchange.   
 
(2) The Relationship between Transactors: Anonymity and Trust 
    Owner managers’ preference of M&A top managements is complex.  Owner 
managers prefer 1) potential acquirers who have no direct relations with owner 
managers, and 2) M&A top management whom owner managers can have personal 
relationship with and trust.  The anonymity and personal relationship seem to be 
inconsistent.  Owner managers tend to choose acquirers with no direct relations in 
ex-ante (before transaction) and expect to strengthen a personal but temporal 
relationship with top management of acquirers in ex-post  (going  transaction).   
    The companies with direct relationship to owner managers mostly do the same 
type of business, so that owner managers are afraid that if the companies accept offer 
from owner managers, they will intentionally or unintentionally leak M&A information 
to other companies in the same area of business.  The information of selling small 
businesses implies poor performance of the companies and is possible to deteriorate the 
credit of the companies in Japan.  This is the first reason why owner managers prefer 
potential acquirers without direct relation to their businesses.    Another owner manager 
said this point:   
 
    A friend who does the same business, said to me, why hadn’t I asked him to 
acquire my company.  I couldn’t do that because I was afraid of a leak of the 
information.    The leakage of any information would have had a harmful influence 
on  my  company.   
  
    The second reason why owner managers prefer companies without direct relation 
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the companies which have direct relations.    An intermediary of Gifu Bank talked this:   
 
        Owner managers hesitate to sell their companies who know owner managers well.   
If they sell their businesses to rival companies, they will lose face.   
 
    This is the reason why owner managers prefer to sell to the companies without 
direct personal relation.  This preference seems to be an element of market exchange.  
Generally, people tend to prefer transactors without personal relationships because 
people hesitate to pursue their financial interest in the negotiation with who they have 
personal relationships with.  If people gift their inalienable things, they may prefer 
someone with who they have personal relationships.  On the other hand, when people 
sell their undetachable properties, they may choose transactors who they do not know at 
all in order not to feel awkward or ashamed.    The anonymity which is a key element of 
market transaction has function of selling undetachable things smoothly.     
    Although owner managers prefer acquirers without direct relationship before 
transaction, they expect to strengthen personal relationship with M&A top management 
through transaction.    It is a key factor to choose acquirers whether owner managers can 
trust M&A top managements or not.    This is an element of gift exchanges.     
    Owner managers seek acquirers who can develop the owners’ businesses and 
assure the employment of their workers after the sale.  If owner managers can have 
personal relationship with M&A top managements and trust each other through 
transaction, owner managers can have confidence that the top managements manage 
owners’ companies according to their expectations.  Conversely, if owner managers 
and top managements of potential buyers fail to have good relationships, the negotiation 
may be broken off even if owner managers are just satisfied with the selling price.    An 
intermediary of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry said:   
 
    Negotiation may break down if owner managers can’t trust top managements of 
acquirers, even if they agree on the terms.   Emotions of owner managers affect 
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attachment to their businesses.       
 
It is essential that for the M&A of small and medium-sized companies the top 
management of acquirers and acquirees trust each other.     
Therefore, intermediaries as go-betweens try to manage the relationship 
appropriately between both parties when they meat with each other.    Top managements 
of acquirers and acquirees negotiate indirectly through intermediaries.  Intermediaries 
demand that each management never negotiate directly because direct negotiation may 
harm their relationship.    One intermediary of Yokohama Shinkin Bank said:       
     
    I usually ask the managements not to talk about the price or other terms.  They 
should talk about the history of each company, their view of life and their firm, or 
the perspective of the Japanese economy.  It is important to discuss these topics 
rather  than  money.   
 
The arguments on the terms of contract tend to stress the relationship of top 
managements economically, impersonally rather than personal.  If intermediaries 
succeed in manage appropriately the situation and the relationship between top 
managements, the possibility of succeeding in these transactions will increase.       
 
(3) Price Setting: Emotional Value vs. Monetary Value 
        We can observe both elements of gift and commodity exchanges at the price setting 
phase.  The elements of gift exchanges are that 1) owner managers refrain from 
pursuing their economic interest, but 2) owner managers tend to evaluate the value of 
their businesses higher than intermediaries or potential acquirers because the 
commitment of owner managers to their businesses is so strong that they evaluate their 
businesses emotionally rather than rationally in economic terms.    These two aspects of 
price setting seem to be inconsistent but these are caused for the same reason, which is a 
deep attachment of owner managers to their companies.     
  13    In market transactions, price should be evaluated rationally.  If owner managers’ 
emotional evaluation of their businesses is higher than rational economic value, 
intermediaries manage to convince owner managers to agree in rational terms.  
Intermediaries do not sympathize with owner managers’ emotion at this phase and they 
try to set the price rationally.    We can say that this aspect of price setting is an element 
of  market  exchange.   
    First of all, let me discuss the elements of gift exchange at this phase.  Most 
owner managers I interviewed accepted and don not complain about the selling price 
offered by intermediaries.    One owner manager gave his view on this point:   
 
        I left the matter of pricing to my intermediary.    All I demanded was that potential 
acquirers assure the employment of all workers and never change their treatment 
for at least a year.    I had no right to demand anything from acquirers except on the 
matter of my employees.  So, I said nothing about the pricing.  I trusted my 
intermediary who evaluated my business, so I agreed on the price.         
 
    The reasons why owner managers refrain from pursuing their economic interests 
are because 1) they regard the assurance of employment of their workers as the most 
important things rather than the selling price, and 2) owner managers tend to feel that 
pursuing economic interests deteriorates the “sacred” value of their businesses.     
    Although  owner  managers  don  not  pursue their economic interest, they sometimes 
are discontent with the evaluation of their businesses offered by intermediaries or 
acquirers.  The reason is that owner managers tend to evaluate their businesses 
emotionally not rationally rather than that they seek high economic profit by selling 
their businesses.  Another owner manager was dissatisfied with the evaluation offered 
by an acquirer:     
 
  My company has about fifty years history.  It has dominated a niche area for a 
long time.  So, my company has great value.  Other rival companies can’t 
compete with my company.  Nevertheless, the value of my business evaluated by 
  14the acquirer was very disappointing.     
  
The owner manager did not pursue his economic interest.  He had pride in his 
company and in his life as a top management, so that he expected much higher 
evaluation.   
    Even if owner managers evaluate their companies emotionally and expect higher 
evaluation, intermediaries manage to convince owner managers of the rational market 
price not the emotional value.  Intermediaries adopt various measures to persuade 
owner managers.    For example, some intermediaries put pressure moderately on owner 
managers, “No one might not acquire your company at such a high price as you expect.”   
Other intermediaries show the price evaluated by several potential acquirers to owner 
managers when owner managers don not consent to the price by one intermediary or 
one  acquirer.   
    Since  rational  price  setting  is  an  essential element of market exchange, 
intermediaries consider economic rationality much more important than the emotion of 
owner managers at the phase of price setting.     
 
(4) Transferability of Ownership: Detachment Owners from Their Businesses 
    Transferability  of  ownership  is  also  an important element of market exchange.    In 
market exchange, the ownership of goods transfers completely to buyers in exchange of 
equivalent  money.   
    This rule of market exchange is also considered as an important thing in M&A of 
small and medium-sized companies.  Owner managers can not be directly involved in 
the management of their businesses after the sale, though they do assist in their 
companies in order to transfer their work know-how to new managers for about six 
month.   
        Intermediaries recommend to owner managers that they completely retire after the 
sale because intermediaries are afraid that owner managers will try to maintain their 
influence over employees even after the sale.  Certainly, owner managers seem to 
maintain their influence over employees because owner managers had overwhelming 
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However, owner managers try of their accord to detach themselves from their 
businesses after the sale.  The reasons are because 1) owner managers also recognize 
the rule of market in terms of the transfer of ownership, and 2) it is difficult for owner 
managers to feel relieved unless owner managers stay involved with the management 
even after the sale.    One owner manager gave these reasons: 
 
Now I still stay at my company in order to transfer my business know-how to new 
manager but I go to my office only once a week.    If I stay involved after the sale, 
I will continue to worry and be concerned about it… However, I know I have no 
right to be further involved the management and order a new manager…  I  don’t 
know recent performance of the company and don’t ask.  If I know this 
information, I will worry, so I completely detach myself from the company.   
 
Transferability of ownership is assured not only by formal rules of market but also by 
the intention of transactors.  Ownership of small companies transfers smoothly to 
acquirers because owner mangers try of their own accord to detach psychologically 
themselves from their businesses.  If owner managers cling to their status in their 
companies, the transfer of ownership will not be go smoothly.       
In this paper I have discussed the M&A process of small and medium-sized 
companies as hybrid exchange types between gift and commodity exchanges.  As 
show in Table 2, the elements of gift and commodity exchanges emerge at each phase of 
the M&A process.  The mosaic of gift and market exchanges generates as a result of 
negotiation over an appropriate exchange form rather than the terms of contract among 
transactors. Owner managers tend to interpret the M&A process as a gift-oriented 
exchange, and on the other hand, potential acquirers tend to recognize it as a 
market-oriented exchange.  Intermediaries manage to balance appropriately each 
element of gift and market exchanges in order to conclude the M&A transaction and 
acquire a contingency fee.  The hybrid types of exchange emerge as a result of 
negotiation among the three players over not only economic interests but also what an 
  16appropriate exchange form is.     





a strong commitment to their
companies
―
2. the relationship with
transactors
Owner managers prefer to
strengthen personal relationships to
potential acquirers
Owner managers prefer potential
acquirers without personal relation
before transaction
Intermediaries try to faciliate
personal relationships between both
parties
―





their busineses emotionally ―
4. transferability
of ownership ― Owner managers detach themselves
from their businesses
―
Intermediaries recommend to owner
managers that they completely
retire after the sale
Table２　Characteristics of M&A of Small Firms
     
The balancing function of intermediaries is important as well as the searching or 
negotiating function of them in the market for small and medium-sized companies.  
Existing researches, mainly in Economics, focus on the functions of searching, 
matching, information transmitting, price setting and negotiating of intermediaries 
(Bowers and Miller, 1990; Garella, 1986; Hunter and Walker, 1990; McLaughlin, 1990; 
Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Yavas, 1992, 1994; Yinger, 1981).    These functions may be 
important in a relatively pure market exchange, for example, the market for used car or 
real estate.  However, where each transactor has a different view of exchange, gift or 
market exchanges, the balancing function of intermediaries may be necessarily.       
 
6 Conclusion   
We have a lot of opportunities to buy and sell various types of things with various 
types of transactors in modern market economies.  Therefore, we may exchange even 
irreplaceable goods in the market, and may buy and sell something with friends or 
family members.  These market transactions may be different from purely a market 
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exchange and may have both elements of gift and commodity exchanges.         
Certainly, market-oriented transactions dominate in modern economies, but if we 
observe carefully market exchanges, we can see in each transaction various types of 
mosaic containing both elements of gift and commodity exchanges.  I believe the 
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